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Strict liability1 in tort occupies a prominent place in Louisiana
jurisprudence. Chief Judge Hunter of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Louisiana has recently written:
"The Louisiana Civil Code is replete with instances of liability based
on breach of duty where there is neither negligence nor intentional
misconduct by the party liable."2 Such liability has been applied in
cases in which defendant has engaged in blasting,3 crop spraying,4
and pile driving.' In a 1971 case, the defendant, having stored
poisonous gas, conceded initial liability for the escape of the gas
despite the absence of any negligence on its part.' In that same year
the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted a strict tort liability approach
with respect to manufacturers of defective products Recently,
there has been further expansion of the areas of human conduct that
are to be governed by the principles of strict tort liability. In 1974
article 2321 of the Louisiana Civil Code, relating to the liability of
the owner of an animal, was construed to impose liability on the
owner "in the nature of strict liability."8 In 1975 there were similar
interpretations of article 2318, relating to parents' liability for
*Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. It is recognized that use of the term "strict liability" may be questioned by
some. In the sense in which the term is used here, it refers to the imposition of liability on
a defendant whose conduct, though harmful, was neither criminal, intentionally wrong-
ful, nor negligent. Judge Sartain of the First Circuit Court of Appeal once referred to
the expression as "sacramental" but went on to say that even without the use of the
words, "[sltrict liability in and of itself is nothing new to Louisiana." Dixon v.
Gutnecht, 339 So. 2d 1285, 1289 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
2. Hastings v. Dis Tran Prod., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 1352, 1355 (W.D. La. 1975).
3. E.g., Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 227 La. 866, 80 So. 2d 845 (1955).
4. E.g., Gotreaux v. Gary, 232 La. 373, 94 So. 2d 293 (1957).
5. E.g., Craig v. Montelepre Realty Co., 252 La. 502, 211 So. 2d 627 (1968).
6. Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971). The Loui-
siana Supreme Court associated liability with article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code,
which reads in part: "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
7. Weber v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971). For a
discussion of the background of Weber and manufacturers' liability in tort, see Robert-
son, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Products in Louisiana Law, 50 TUL. L.
REV. 50, 51-57 (1975).
8. Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974) (dog bite).
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damage occasioned by their minor children,9 and article 2317, relat-
ing to the liability of the owner or possessor of a thing."
Whenever doctrinal developments of such importance take
place, many questions arise that can only be answered definitively
by future litigation and judicial decisions.11 One such question in-
volves the extent to which contributory fault on the part of the in-
jured person will be allowed as a defense in an action based on
strict tort liability.12 A related question, and the one to which the en-
suing discussion is devoted, is how the new Louisiana comparative
fault statute will function in these cases. It is the thesis of this arti-
cle that, to the extent that plaintiff's contributory fault is allowed as
a defense, the comparative fault statute should be incorporated into
the juridical structure of strict tort liability. Furthermore, it is con-
tended that Louisiana jurisprudence is in a posture to permit this to
be done without the confusion, uncertainty, and injustice experi-
enced in some common law states that have faced the problem.
EXPERIENCE IN COMMON LAW STATES
In recent years, a number of state courts (and federal courts ap-
plying state law) have been confronted with the question whether
the state's comparative negligence statute (or court doctrine) should
be applied in cases in which strict tort liability is the basis of the ac-
tion. Conceptual and theoretical difficulties have been encountered
in each instance. The courts have found these difficulties insur-
mountable in a few cases and have rejected application of compara-
tive negligence principles. In the majority the ultimate result has
been in favor of such application, but some of the opinions have been
characterized by strained reasoning or judicial improvisation. The
following is a brief summary of these developments outside Loui-
siana.
Oklahoma was one of the first states whose supreme court re-
jected application of its comparative negligence statute in a case of
strict tort liability. In Kirkland v. General Motors Corp.3 plaintiff
had been injured by a defect in the car she was driving. The court's
attention focused principally on establishing the state's framework
for manufacturers' strict tort liability for defective products. There
was evidence of plaintiff's heavy drinking which convinced the court
9. Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975) (child riding a bicycle).
10. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975) (fall of a tree).
11. See George, Strict Liability in Tort- Will the Weber Rule be Extended to
Non-manufacturers?, 23 LA. B.J. 191 (1975); Robertson, supra note 7.
12. See Comment, Fault Of The Victim: The Limits of Liability Under Civil Code
Articles 2317, 2318 and 2321, 38 LA. L. REV. 995 (1978).
13. 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974).
[Vol. 40
1980] STRICT TORT LIABILITY
that her undertaking to drive constituted a misuse of the product,
and for that reason her cause of action was barred. In reaching that
result the court added, in dictum phrased in strong terms, that the
relatively new comparative negligence law14 had no bearing on the
case because its application "is specifically limited to negligence ac-
tions" and "manufacturers' product liability is not negligence, nor is
it to be treated as a negligence action .... "15
In 1976 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit, applying Nebraska law, expressed its disapproval of permitting
comparative negligence to be considered in a strict liability case,
saying that to do so would be "extremely confusing and inappropri-
ate." A similar view was taken that year by the Colorado Court of
Appeals." The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
in a case involving Oregon law, took the same position. 8 The New
Jersey Supreme Court in 1969 expressed a favorable attitude
toward the application of comparative negligence in strict product
liability cases, 9 but the court has left the question open after the
adoption in 1973 of a comparative negligence statute in that state."0
In all of these cases the insuperable difficulty was the use of the
term "negligence" in the comparative negligence statute's descrip-
tion of the kind of conduct on the part of defendant with which
plaintiff's contributory negligence was to be compared, or in the
14. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 11 (1973) provides in pertinent part: "Contributory negli-
gence shall not bar recovery of damages for any injury, property damage or death
where the negligence of the person injured or killed is of lesser degree than the negli-
gence of any person, firm, or corporation causing such damage." (Emphasis added.)
15. 521 P.2d at 1367 (emphasis added).
16. Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795, 802 (8th Cir. 1976). The Nebraska
statute was restricted to "all actions brought to recover damages ... caused by the
negligence of another." NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1975) (emphasis added). The result
in Melia was legislatively overruled in 1978 when the Nebraska legislature amended
the statute to make it applicable to actions for damages for injuries caused by "the
negligence or act or omission giving rise to strict liability in tort of another." NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (Supp. 1978).
17. Krinard v. Coats Co., 553 P.2d 835 (Colo. App. 1976). COLo. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-111 (1973) provides in pertinent part: "(1) Contributory negligence shall not bar
recovery in any action . . . for negligence resulting in death or injury." (Emphasis
added.)
18. Brown v. Link Belt Corp., 565 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1977). The statute that
governed the action, OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1971), contained terms similar to those
of the Oklahoma statute set out in note 14, supra. Oregon has since amended the
statute to allow comparison of plaintiff's contributory negligence with defendant's fault
rather than with his negligence. The court's opinion in Brown suggests that under the
new terms the statute would apply to strict tort liability actions. See 565 F.2d at 1112.
19. Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc., 53 N.J. 463, 474, 251 A.2d 278, 284 (1969).
20. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:15-5.1 to .2 (1973). See Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng. Co., 76
N.J. 152, 189, 386 A.2d 816, 834 (1978); Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco of New Jersey,
161 N.J. Super. 301, 311, 391 A.2d 928, 933 (1978).
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description of the kind of action in which the statute was to be ap-
plied. The concept of negligence as a distinct tort apart from the
other nominal torts is deeply ingrained in common law jurispru-
dence. The concept of "strict liability" involves holding defendant
responsible without any showing of negligence or despite a showing
of his exercise of the utmost care; it is commonly regarded as a
separate basis for a tort action. This dichotomy makes it theoretical-
ly impossible for the two to be compared. In the words of one com-
mentator, "no comparison of conduct is possible, since the bases of
imposition of strict and negligent liability are dissimilar."'" Other
writers' metaphors include allusions to "square pegs in round
holes,"22 comparing a quart of milk to a three foot metal bar, 3 and
inquiries whether oil and water can mix or whether apples and
oranges can be compared.25
Despite these conceptual and theoretical difficulties, the major-
ity of those common law jurisdictions that have faced the issue have
found some way to allow the state comparative negligence statute to
function in strict tort liability cases. However, in certain instances
the means have been questionable. The earliest judicial effort was
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. That state has had a comparative
negligence statute since 1931.2' In 1967, in Dippel v. Sciano,27 the
court determined that a manufacturer's liability for an unreasonably
dangerous product was not based on warranty but on strict tort
liability. At the conclusion of its analysis, in remarks admittedly
obiter dicta, the court stated that contributory negligence could be a
defense and that the comparative negligence statute should have its
usual role in such cases. It reached this result by the extraordinary
reasoning that the imposition of liability without negligence was
"akin to negligence per se" as that doctrine operates when a penal
21. Note, Products Liability, Comparative Negligence, and the Allocation of
Damages Among Multiple Defendants, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 73, 102 (1976).
22. Robinson, Square Pegs (Products Liability) In Round Holes (Comparative
Negligence), 52 CAL. ST. B.J. 16 (1977).
23. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 751, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 396, 575
P.2d 1162, 1177 (1978) (Jefferson, J., dissenting).
24. Feinberg, The Applicability of a Comparative Negligence Defense in a Strict
Products Liability Suit Based on Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2d, 42 INS.
COUNSEL J. 39 (1975).
25. This expression was mentioned in the majority opinion of the California
Supreme Court in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 734, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380, 385, 575 P.2d 1162, 1167 (1978), but the court refuted the argument.
26. WiS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1979) provides: "Contributory negligence
shall not bar recovery in an action by any person . . . if such negligence was not
greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any
* damages shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable
to the person recovering." (Emphasis added.)
27. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
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statute is violated. This approach was reiterated and elaborated
seven years later in Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc.28 No other
court has followed that course of reasoning in addressing the prob-
lem under consideration.29 This "strange" Wisconsin approach has
led the court into a doctrinal morass, and in the years following
Powers the court has made several attempts to extricate itself. Its
efforts are discussed thoroughly and entertainingly elsewhere by
Professor Twerski 3
0
Another device that has been used to avoid the theoretical and
conceptual difficulties of comparing negligent and non-negligent con-
duct is the concept of "comparative causation."3 ' The fact finder
determines the comparative causal effect of defendant's non-negli-
gent conduct and that of plaintiff's negligence. To the degree that
plaintiff's negligence contributed to his injury, his damages are re-
duced in conformity with the state's comparative methods. This kind
of reasoning may not only solve the theoretical problem, but may
also overcome the limitations in a state's comparative negligence
statute. That is apparently what happened in Texas in General
Motors Corp. v. Hopkins.2 The Texas comparative negligence stat-
ute allows contributory negligence as a complete defense if it is
more than 50% of the total negligence in the case. Texas also im-
poses strict tort liability on manufacturers of defective products.3
The supreme court held that if a defective product is misused, a
comparison should be made of the causative effects of the defect and
of the misuse and the respective percentages thereof (totalling
28. 64 Wis. 2d 532, 535-37, 219 N.W.2d 393, 395 (1974).
29. In Busch v. Busch Construction, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977), the Min-
nesota Supreme Court paid homage to the Wisconsin result because "our adoption of
the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute [in 1969] presumed our adoption of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute up to that point." Id. at 393.
The Minnesota opinion, however, reflects greater sympathy with the "comparative
causation" analysis. The Minnesota statute, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (1969), was
amended in 1978 to change to comparative fault terminology and to define "fault" to
include conduct that subjects a person to strict liability.
30. See Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some
Products Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 297, 319 (1977).
31. The United States District Court of Idaho was one of the first to suggest the
innovative doctrine of comparing causation. Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming
Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976). The district judge wrote that the rationale of
that state's comparative negligence statute "extends to a comparison of all legal causes
of the plaintiff's injuries and results in a sensible and fair method of loss allocation."
Id. at 603.
The Idaho statute provides for comparison of plaintiff's contributory negligence "if
such negligence was not as great as the negligence or gross negligence of the person
against whom recovery is sought." IDAHO CODE § 6-801 (1971).
32. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
33. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon 1973).
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100/o) determined. Plaintiff's damages are then reduced by the
percentage of causation attributable to the misuse. The court then
wrote: "This comparison and division of causes is not to be confused
with the statutory scheme of modified comparative negligence which
bars all recovery to the plaintiff if his negligence is greater than the
negligence of the parties against whom recovery is sought."34
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in an admiralty
case35 held that strict liability applied to products supplied by manu-
facturers and that the concept of comparative fault, long applicable
to personal injury cases under the Jones Act3" and the Death on the
High Seas Act,37 would also be applied to products liability. The
court uses the term "comparative causation," stating that it "is a
conceptually more precise term than 'comparative fault' since fault
alone without causation does not subject one to liability." At the end
of the discussion the court states, "It comes down to this: the defen-
dant is strictly liable for the harm caused from his defective prod-
uct, except that the award of damages shall be reduced in propor-
tion to the plaintiff's contribution to his own loss or injury."38
An interesting evolution of this nature took place in New Hamp-
shire. In 1969 the New Hampshire legislature adopted a modified
comparative negligence statute.3" For several years thereafter it was
assumed by the federal courts in the first circuit that the New
Hampshire Supreme Court would extend the principles of that stat-
ute to strict liability cases." In 1978, however, that court refused to
do so." Instead, it held that "strict liability" is a judicially created
doctrine, to which the principle of comparative causation should be
applied. This principle, said the court, will avoid the difficulties of
semantics, which become extremely important when the trial judge
attempts to convey these concepts to a jury in his charge. The effect
of the doctrine is that if plaintiff establishes the basis for a strict
liability claim, "the jury must weigh the plaintiff's misconduct, if
any, and reduce the amount of damages by the percentage that the
plaintiff's misconduct contributed to cause his loss or injury so long
as it is not greater than fifty percent." 2
34. 548 S.W.2d at 352.
35. Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. and Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129
(9th Cir. 1977).
36. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976).
37. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761 & 766 (1976).
38. 565 F.2d at 1139.
39. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1969 & Supp. 1970).
40. Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974); Stevens v.
Kanematsu-Gosho Co., 494 F.2d 367 (1st Cir. 1974); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp.,
339 F. Supp. 676 (D. N.H. 1972).
41. Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978).
42. Id at 850.
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A number of courts that have applied comparative negligence
statutes in strict tort liability cases have not found it necessary to
resort to unique reasoning processes. They have disposed of the
theoretical difficulties adequately, but the principal factors influenc-
ing them seem to be certain pragmatic considerations and their con-
viction that justice and desirable public policy call for the result
reached.
In 1976 the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that its judge-
made "pure" comparative negligence doctrine would apply to strict
products liability cases.43 It emphasized the anomalous situation that
would exist if damages were reduced when a negligent plaintiff won
against a negligent manufacturer, but would not be reduced if the
same plaintiff won against a non-negligent manufacturer.
One of the most helpful opinions in this area is that issued in
1978 by the California Supreme Court in Daly v. General Motors
Corp." The California court had previously adopted a "pure" com-
parative negligence system by judicial decision. 5 In Daly it extended
that doctrine to strict liability cases. The court answered squarely
opposing arguments of a conceptual and semantic nature,46 but laid
particular stress on the point that among the "felicitous" results of
its decision would be equitable apportionment of loss. In agreeing
with the Alaska court concerning the peculiar result that an oppo-
site decision would bring, it observed that such a juridical arrange-
ment "rewards adroit pleading and selection of theories" and would
be a "bizarre anomaly. 4 7
The United States District Court for Kansas held that the Kan-
sas comparative negligence statute applies to strict tort liability in
products cases.48 It expressly disagreed with the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's decision in Kirkland and pointed to the result in that case
(complete barring of plaintiff's action) as an illustration of the harsh
outcome that follows if comparative negligence does not enter into
the decision. The opinion contains an excellent discussion of the con-
siderations entering into the application of comparative fault princi-
ples.
43. Butaud v. Suburban Mar. & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alas. 1976). The
Alaska Supreme Court adopted "pure" comparative negligence in Kaatz v. Alaska, 540
P.2d 1037 (Alas. 1975).
44. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978).
45. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1266 (1975).
46. To the "apples and oranges" argument the court replied that the term "con-
tributory negligence" may itself be a misnomer, "since it lacks the first element of the
classical negligence formula, namely, a duty of care owing to another .... Contributory
fault would be a more descriptive term." 20 Cal. 3d at 735, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386, 575
P.2d at 1168.
47. Id. at 738, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387, 575 P.2d at 1169.
48. Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740, 750 (D. Kan. 1978).
1980]
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The Florida Supreme Court in response to an inquiry received
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled
that manufacturers of defective products were strictly liable in tort
and that the comparative negligence statute applied.49 Upon receipt
of this answer the court of appeals adjusted a judgment in favor of
plaintiff to reflect the comparison, reducing it by 35%."0
The fifth circuit, applying Mississippi law, reached a similar
result. 1 The court noted that the issue had not been considered by
the Mississippi Supreme Court but based its decision on its belief
that that court would follow the urging of Professor Wade in his
1973 article in the Mississippi Law Journal.2
THE DOCTRINAL SITUATION IN LOUISIANA
The extent to which plaintiff's conduct is a defense in actions
based on strict tort liability has not been developed fully in Loui-
siana. In the recently announced areas of such liability under arti-
cles 2317, 2321, and 2318, it seems quite clear that contributory fault
is a defense. In each of the cases, Holland v. Buckley, 3 Turner v.
Bucher,54 and Loescher v. Parr," the court expressly stated that
three defenses are available to exculpate defendant from liability,
the first one being a showing "that the harm was caused by the
fault of the victim." Since those decisions, there have been three
cases denying liability under article 2321, two of them based on con-
tributory negligence" and one on assumption of risk. 7 Under article
2318 there has been one case in which liability was defeated by the
victim's negligent act 58 and one recognizing assumption of risk as
defeating liability. 9 Under article 2317 two cases have denied re-
covery to the injured person because of contributory fault,"0 and one
49. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976).
50. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 547 F.2d 885, 887 (5th Cir. 1977).
51. Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 290 (5th Cir. 1975).
52. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825
(1973).
53. 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974).
54. 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975).
55. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
56. Parker v. Hanks, 345 So. 2d 194 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 So. 2d 224
(La. 1977); Dotson v. Continental Ins. Co., 322 So. 2d 284 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 325 So. 2d 606 (La. 1976).
57. Fontenot v. Soileau, 336 So. 2d 1006 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
58. Hebert v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 355 So. 2d 575 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
59. Thibo v. Aetna Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 20 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 So.
2d 674 (La. 1977).
60. American Road Ins. Co. v. Montgomery, 354 So. 2d 656 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 356 So. 2d 430 (La. 1978); Korver v. City of Baton Rouge, 348 So. 2d
708 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
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has denied it on the basis of assumption of risk."
In the area of strict tort liability for ultrahazardous activities
the situation is less clear. In Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp.,"2 in-
volving the escape of poisonous gas, defendant admitted it was
responsible for the damage caused by the escape of the gas and that
negligence was not the criterion for determining its responsibility.,
Nevertheless, it argued that under either the theory of contributory
negligence or that of assumption of risk plaintiff could and should
have avoided the damage he suffered. In the course of his opinion,
Justice Barham made the following pertinent remarks: "The defense
of contributory negligence which is urged here presupposes original
negligence on the part of the defendant. This case is not a case
where negligence is an ingredient of fault, and contributory negli-
gence is not a defense." 3 However, as to assumption of risk he
wrote: "A plaintiff who with full knowledge and appreciation of the
danger voluntarily exposes himself to the risks and embraces the
danger cannot recover damages for injury which may occur.""
Thus, it would appear that in this category of cases inadvertent con-'
tributory negligence, involving only a failure to use due care to
observe or discover a danger or to guard against its existence,
would not be a defense, whereas the voluntary encountering of a
known danger could be a defense.
In the area of strict tort liability for defective products, the ex-
tent to which plaintiff's contributory negligence or assumption of
risk may be a defense has yet to be answered definitively.65 Gener-
ally, common law jurisdictions follow a similar approach: while the
kind of contributory fault that involves use of the product with full
realization of the defect and resultant danger (assumption of risk) is
a defense, inadvertent contributory fault in the sense of failure to
identify the danger or guard against the possibility of its existence
is not. In Hastings v. Dis Tran Products, Inc.,67 United States Dis-
trict Judge Hunter, after examining the Louisiana cases and relying
61. Richards v. Marlow, 347 So. 2d 281 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977). For a thorough
analysis and discussion of the above cases see-Comment, supra note 12.
62. 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
63. Id. at 1086, 249 So. 2d at 140.
64. Id. In some states the comparative negligence system has prompted the incor-
poration of assumption of risk doctrines into contributory negligence. E.g., Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d at 829, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875, 532 P.2d at 1243; Gilson v.
Drees Bros., 19 Wis. 2d 252, 258-59, 120 N.W.2d 63, 67 (1963).
65. Consideration is not given here to misuse or alteration of the product since
that defense goes to establishing that the product was not defective in the, first in-
stance.
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n (1965).
67. 389 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. La. 1975).
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heavily on Justice Barham's language quoted above, wrote "The
direction, tone and attitude of the Louisiana cases persuade me that
the Louisiana Supreme Court will continue its development of the
doctrines of strict liability in conformance with the Restatement."68
Accordingly he reached the conclusion that contributory negligence
is not a defense to strict tort liability when such negligence consists
merely in a failure to discover the defect or to guard against the
possibility of its existence, nor is contributory negligence "in a
broad sense (the ordinary prudent man test)" a defense. A defense
does exist if plaintiff's conduct takes the form of voluntarily and
unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, "which com-
monly passes under the name of assumption of risk."69 The same
view was taken in two subsequent federal cases."0
THE EFFECT OF THE LOUISIANA COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE STATUTE
It seems apparent from the foregoing that plaintiff's conduct
contributing to his injury has played and will continue to play an im-
portant defensive role in strict tort liability litigation in Louisiana.
We turn then to the effect that the comparative negligence statute
is likely to have.
The Statutory Language
The material provisions of the Louisiana comparative negligence
statute enacted during the regular session of 1979 consists of
amendments to article 2323 of the Civil Code and article 1811 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
Amended article 2323 provides as follows:
When contributory negligence is applicable to a claim for
damages, its effect shall be as follows: If a person suffers injury,
death or loss as the result partly of his own negligence and partly
as a result of the fault of another person or persons, the claim
for damages shall not thereby be defeated, but the amount of
damages recoverable shall be reduced in proportion to the
degree or percentage of negligence attributable to the person
suffering the injury, death or loss. 1
68. Id. at 1358.
69. Id. at 1359.
70. Khoder v. AMF, Inc., 539 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1976); Le Bouef v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 451 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. La. 1978). For a complete discussion of the en-
tire subject matter see Robertson, supra note 7. See also Comment, Defense to a Loui-
siana Products Liability Action, 25 Loy. L. REV. 93 (1979).




Implementation of the provision under amended article 1811 of
the Code of Civil Procedure is by means of a special verdict. The
special verdict will serve to determine whether the defendant was
at fault, whether such fault was a proximate cause of the damages,
and the degree of such fault expressed in percentage. Similarly,
with respect to any party claiming damage, the jury must make a
finding as to the existence of negligence attributable to him,
whether it was a proximate cause of the damages, and the degree of
such negligence expressed in percentage.
This is a so-called "pure" comparative negligence statute. Such a
statute is differentiated from the limited or qualified statutes, which
cut off plaintiff's claim entirely if his negligence is equal to or in
some states greater than the fault attributable to defendant.
The terminology of the statute evidences commendable crafts-
manship, particularly with respect to its effect on the issue with
which this article is concerned. It will be noted that the statute is
designed to function in any case in which "contributory negligence is
applicable to a claim for damages." It does not purport to designate
the classes of actions in which contributory negligence is applicable;
that is left to the courts. Further, the elements in the case that are
to be compared are found in the terms prescribing that the statute
applies where plaintiff's injury is incurred "as the result partly of
his own (plaintiff's) negligence and partly as a result of the fault of
another person or persons." The reference to "negligence" on the
part of the plaintiff and "fault" on the part of defendant is carried
through into the procedural provisions of the statute. The special
verdict of the jury must identify the percentage of "fault" on the
part of the defendant and the percentage of "negligence" on the
part of plaintiff.
The statutory language mentioned is of crucial significance to
the problem we are considering. As indicated in the previous discus-
sion, the comparative negligence statutes of many common law
states refer to defendant's "negligence" and plaintiff's "negligence,"
or apply to actions for damages based on defendant's "negligence."
Such language has caused their courts' conceptual and semantic
difficulties. The terminology of the Louisiana statute ought to free
its courts of any such troubles. The concept of "fault" in Louisiana
law is a broad one. 2 Justice Barham's opinion in Langlois includes
an informative discussion of the nature of fault." After pointing out
72. In two cases involving pile driving damage, negligence was referred to as "an
example of fault." See Craig v. Montelepre, 252 La. 502, 513, 211 So. 2d 627, 631 (1968);
Gulf Ins. Co. v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 170 So. 2d 125, 127 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1964).
73. 258 La. at 1076, 249 So. 2d at 136.
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that the term as used in article 2315 includes more than
"negligence," "imprudence," or "want of skill" as enumerated in arti-
cle 2316, Justice Barham articulates the theory of the imposition of
liability as follows:
Here we find that proof that the gas escaped is sufficient, and
proof of lack of negligence and lack of imprudence will not excul-
pate the defendant. The defendant has injured this plaintiff by
its fault as analogized from the conduct required under Civil
Code Article 669 and others, and responsibility for the damage
attaches to defendants under Civil Code Article 2315.74
In the three relatively recent cases imposing strict liability the
concept of "fault" is further elaborated. Holland held the owner of a
domesticated animal strictly liable for the damage it caused. Accord-
ing to the court, in that circumstance "the master of the animal is
presumed to be at fault. '75 In Turner, holding a parent strictly liable
for the delicts of his minor child, the court stated that the parent
was "legally at fault" and that such fault "is determined without
regard to whether the parent could or could not have prevented the
act of the child, i.e., without regard to the parent's negligence.""
Similarly in Loescher, in which the owner of land was held strictly
liable for the fall of a tree, the court indicates that the "fault" of the
defendant is based upon his failure to prevent the person or thing
for which he is responsible from causing unreasonable risk of injury
to others. According to Justice Tate, the defendant's "fault rests
upon his failure to prevent the risk-creating harm and upon his obli-
gation to guard against the condition or activity (by the person or
thing for which he is responsible) which creates the unreasonable
risk of harm to others. 77
Almost thirty years ago Professor Ferdinand F. Stone listed the
three traditional touchstones of tort liability as criminal conduct, in-
tentional wrong, and negligence, and suggested a fourth to be
denominated "legal fault. '78 Stone expressed his analysis as follows:
It is suggested that the new touchstone of tort liability
which is emerging is legal fault or a falling below the standard
of conduct set by those forces in society which have powers of
social control. It is as yet too early (even if it were ever advis-
able) to state the precise content of the touchstone of legal fault.
Certain it is, however, that within it may be contained the
74. Id. at 1083, 249 So. 2d at 140 (emphasis added).
75. 305 So. 2d at 119.
76. 308 So. 2d at 277.
77. 324 So. 2d at 446.
78. Stone, Touchstones of Tort Liability, 2 STAN. L. REV. 259 (1950).
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earlier touchstones of unlawfulness, intention, and negligence,
and yet these do not comprise the whole. There is more. It is a
wide term and purposely so."
The modern thinking of the Louisiana Supreme Court seems to
parallel that of Professor Stone.
The conclusion suggested by the foregoing authorities seems
clear. There are no conceptual or semantic barriers to the applica-
tion of the Louisiana comparative negligence statute in cases involv-
ing strict tort liability. The legislative directive is to compare plain-
tiff's contributory "negligence" with defendant's "fault" in any claim
for damages in which contributory negligence is applicable. The
Louisiana Supreme Court has already decided that in certain actions
for damages based on strict tort liability contributory negligence is
applicable. Perhaps the only remaining point for inquiry is whether
any consideration of public policy should prevent application of the
statute.
Policy Considerations
It is in the field of strict tort liability for defective products that
the strongest policy differences have surfaced with respect to appli-
cation of comparative principles. Those who oppose their application
argue that enterprise liability is the primary underlying policy;
"public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused
by products intended for consumption be placed on those who
market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which
liability insurance can be obtained."8 This basic policy is defeated to
the extent that plaintiff's recovery is reduced by comparative negli-
gence, for only a part of the loss falls on the party who can dis-
tribute it and the other part is borne by the consumer or bystander
who cannot do so.8'
The argument advanced by those who favor application of com-
parative principles is that enterprise liability was not intended solely
as a loss distribution mechanism. In the words of Justice Traynor in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,82 the fountainhead of strict
products liability, "The purpose of such liability is to insure that the
costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by
79. Id. at 283. See also F. STONE, TORT. DOCTRINE § 61, in 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 89 (1977).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c (1965).
81. See Hickey, Comparative, Fault and Strict Products Liability: Are They Com-
patible?, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 501 (1978).
82. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
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the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves."83 A
plaintiff who is contributorily negligent, at least in the sense of
assuming a known risk, can scarcely be said to be "powerless" to
protect himself.
Furthermore, it is unreasonable to expect other consumers of a
product to bear the total cost of losses attributable in part to plain-
tiff's misconduct. 4 Indeed, from the standpoint of general social wel-
fare it would seem desirable to encourage due care and prudence on
the part of consumers and users as well as manufacturers.
The conventional economic theory underlying strict products
liability is that defendants, who are manufacturers or sellers, are in
a position to distribute the loss among the consuming public through
insurance or product pricing. Over twenty years ago, before the fall
of the citadel, this writer questioned the soundness of that theory as
a generality.88 In the case of the industrial giant, such as General
Motors, with millions of product units each carrying a relatively
high price tag, the theory may have some merit. In the case of the
small manufacturer or other business facing strong competition, the
theory has not worked well. One has only to examine the Report of
the Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability to realize
the havoc the theory has caused in some fields and the reason for
the attacks on the product liability reparation system that have
developed at the federal and state levels. 7 Comparative negligence
is one mechanism by which there may be mitigation of some degree
of the destructive effects that have developed.88
The California Supreme Court, which many consider the parent
of the entire structure of strict products liability, has consistently
taken the position that the primary policy involved is simply one of
relieving the plaintiff from the unfair or impossible problem of proof
inherent in pursuing negligence. 9 Reducing plaintiff's recovery in
83. Id. at 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 377 P.2d at 901 (emphasis added).
84. Pinto, Comparative Responsibility- An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 45 INS.
COUNSEL J. 115 (1978); Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42
TENN. L. REV. 171, 179 (1974); Note, Comparative Negligence in a Strict Products
Liability Action, 14 IDAHO L. REV. 723 (1978).
85. Pinto, supra note 84.
86. Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injury Caused by Defects in Prod-
ucts-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938 (1957).
87. See Executive Summary for the Final Report of the Federal Interagency
Task Force on Product Liability, 1977 INS. L.J. 686; Epstein, Products Liability: The
Search for Middle Ground, 56 N.C. L. REV. 643 (1978); Schwartz, Proposed Remedies
for the American Problem: U.S. Government Activity, 29 MERCEIt L. REV. 437, 440
(1978).
88. See Kroll, Comparative Fault: A New Generation in Products Liability, 1977
INS. L.J. 492.
89. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d at 736, 144 Cal. Rptr. at
386, 575 P.2d at 1168.
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proportion to his own fault would seem entirely consistent with that
purpose.
Another policy argument in opposition to applying comparative
principles to products liability relates to the effect strict tort liabil-
ity is thought to have on manufacturers in inducing them to produce
products that are free from defect. Professor Twerski fears that by
utilizing comparative principles, "we may be reducing the defen-
dant's financial exposure to the point where maintaining the design
defect becomes economically prudent."9 This argument has been dis-
counted as not convincing91 and as "more shadow than substance."92
If the weight of the policy arguments is measured on the basis
of their reception by the courts, the score is decidedly in favor of
those who advocate application of comparative principles. Not only
have the majority of decisions applied such principles but those that
have rejected application have not based their position on policy
grounds. The refusal has been for conceptual or semantic reasons
rather than policy considerations. 3
With respect to other kinds of human conduct in which strict
tort liability is imposed, there does not seem to be any basic or per-
vasive public policy that would compete with the policy underlying
comparative negligence. Adoption of a comparative negligence stat-
ute represents a legislative purpose that the harsh, complete bar to
recovery imposed by the old contributory negligence rule should be
put aside in favor of an equitable allocation of loss between plaintiff
and defendant. Certain abnormally dangerous activities which are
socially desirable are so likely to harm others that the law tells the
one pursuing them that he is free to do so, but must pay for the
harm he causes despite his use of due care or the utmost care. To
the extent that contributory negligence in whatever form is a
defense he is relieved of that obligation. But there is nothing in the
basic strict liability policy that requires that defendant pay all and
plaintiff fault be ignored. A similar view is warranted as to parents,
owners of animals, and owners or custodians of things. For reasons
that have roots deep in the history of the Louisiana Civil Code such
persons carry the burden of strict liability; but the Louisiana courts
have repeatedly held that the obligation is not absolute and can be
extinguished by plaintiff's negligence. If contributory negligence is
90. Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liabil-
ity, 10 IND. L. REV. 797, 802 (1977).
91. Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's Fault-The Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, 23 MERCER L. REV. 373, 387 (1978).
92. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d at 737, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387, 575
P.2d at 1169.
93. See section entitled "Experience in Common Law States," supra.
94. See section entitled "The Doctrinal Situation in Louisiana," supra.
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pertinent in such cases it seems to follow that comparative negli-
gence as legislatively imposed is also pertinent.
If comparative principles are not allowed to function there will
be the paradoxical situation in strict liability areas in which a defen-
dant who admits or is proved to be negligent will be liable for only
part of the damages caused to a contributorily negligent plaintiff,
whereas a defendant who is entirely innocent and has done his best,
albeit unsuccessfully, to avoid causing injury will be liable for all
damages including the portion caused by the negligent plaintiff. This
and similar possibilities, as recognized by some courts, will promote
adroit gamesmanship in pleading and practice that decades of
reform effort have sought to eliminate from our system of justice."
Finally, the most compelling policy reason for extending com-
parative principles to strict tort liability areas was well stated by
the California Supreme Court in the following language:
We conclude, accordingly, that the expressed purposes
which persuaded us in the first instance to adopt strict liability
in California would not be thwarted were we to apply compara-
tive principles. What would be forfeit is a degree of semantic
symmetry. However, in this evolving area of tort law in which
new remedies are judicially created, and old defenses judicially
merged, impelled by strong consideration of equity and fairness
we seek a larger synthesis. If a more just result follows from the
expansion of comparative principles, we have no hesitancy in
seeking it ....
95. Butuaud v. Suburban Mar. & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 46 (Alas.
1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d at 738, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387, 575 P.2d
at 1169.
96. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d at 737, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387, 575
P.2d at 1169.
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